Counteraccusations section

The reasons why counteraccusations do not work are of course outlined in the following articles where various accusations are suggested or made in response to things which I have said about the FCO and the college and then admitted to be made up.

More importantly however, it is an unfortunate fact for the powers that be that they have elected to install Simon Shercliff as the person is in charge of information operations (IOPS) and by consequence the Joint threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG) at the foreign and commonwealth office, bodies which collate, distort and spread misinformation through the press, international databases or which indicate that they wish to do as much. He is also on the DSMA commitee (a body in charge of suppressing information which is disfavourable to the government) and was moreover the head of counterintelligence at the foreign office when the harassment began in 2013.

It is obviously somewhat less than impartial to have such an individual from the college in such an exalted position and obviously looks rather defensive, something which they should perhaps have realized when they installed Jonathan Allen as Director of national security given that he also comes from the college.

It is also rather amusing that they should imply or attempt as much given when Jonathan Allan was head of national security at the FCO in 2017, the Russian government extended an invite to the British government to talk about trade and relations. This was whilst I was claiming asylum there which was partly in relation to my project and the harassment which had taken place during and since my period at college.

In response, with the help of the then cabinet Secretary Sir Jeremy Heywood and the current editor of the Evening standard, George Osborne, a decision was reached, for some unfathomable reason, to appoint Rona Fairhead who happens to be an alumni of the college as the Minister for international trade. You may have read about her in private eye.

It just so happens that my bank account in Russia was cut off shortly afterwards which given the fact that I did not have a visa was intended to make me go and seek assistance from the department where Johnathon Allen was DNS. This can only reasonably be interpreted as a consequence of a bargain with the Russian government.

It is rather ironic of course that in response to concerns about me having to reveal corruption as part of my asylum claim, a decision is reached to prove as much by using members of the college as part of a bargain with the Russian government.

It also does seem rather “odd” that Dr Hermann Hauser is vice chair of the European Innovation Council a body which is supposedly intended to promote innovation in the European Union whilst individuals at the college and beyond are carrying out corporate spying on his behalf. It is somewhat of a conflict of interest and rather discredits attempts on the part of the European Union as is the intention of the EIC to wish to rank alongside the likes of China and the United States when it comes to being a technology superpower. Given this, attempts by the European Union to do as much sadly remind me of Prince Edwards attempts at running a television company

Given that the British government went to such lengths in my case, it does rather tend to discredit the claim that attempts to influence governments at a high level has not applied in other cases, with particular reference to Canada,  as well as any claim that the Skripals affair whereby the British government carried out a chemical weapons attack on British soil did not pertain to the actions of myself and the information they knew I held. It does also further discredits a claim that both the harassment and the reasons for my admission were not sanctioned by the cabinet office.

I should also perhaps mention the US dimension in that from the outset they have cooperated with the British government at a very high level and apart from assenting to my admission and the harassment, which they have had to have done given the fact that American intelligence oversees British intelligence, they employed an individual known as Kang Tchou who worked for the CIA and the NSA as part of the harassment. Kang Tchou has a criminal record apparently. Given all this as well as the fact that he was the person with delegated responsibility for the harassment which forms part of the modern equivalent of COINTELPRO and given the fact that the US government will never admit to its operation, they can hardly be said to be likely to act in an impartial manner.

Anyway here are some counter-allegations

  1. Why counter-accusations are not necessarily GCHQ’s best friend
  2. What is the difference between a terrorist and those who encourage terrorism
  3. A carousel of nonsense (or the definition of madness)
  4. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 1 (“You’re a wierdo spy. Oh no sorry we lied”)
  5. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 2 (“Teach in exchange for your work or else!”)
  6. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 3 (“There must be some dirt. Oh no there isn’t”)
  7. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 4 (“We’ll impoverish you if you do not work for us. Oh no we can’t”)
  8. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 5 (“You work for the FSB/GRU. Oh no sorry we lied”)
  9. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 6 (“You work for the CIA. Oh no sorry we lied”)
  10. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 7 (“You owe us money. No actually we owe you money”)
  11. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 8 (“Lets make some fake pics. Oh no we can’t”)
  12. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 9 (“Lets spy on friends and family. On no we can’t”)
  13. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 10 (‘You work for Iran. On no sorry we lied’)
  14. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 11 (“He’s gay. No, he’s not but lets interfere in family life”)
  15. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 12 (“We’re liars and we’d better slow down his internet to keep the fact secret”)
  16. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 13 (“Lets try a ruse. Oh no we can’t”)
  17. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 14 (“Lets try and conceal the truth. Oh no we can’t)
  18. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 15 (“AI will beat him. No it will beat us”)
  19. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 16 (“He’s mad. Oh no we lied”)
  20. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 17 (“He’s a threat. Oh no we lied”)
  21. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 18 (“Shall we harm him in some way. On no we can’t”)
  22. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 19 (“Let’s show our motives for faking evidence and reveal much about Europol”)
  23. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 20 (“Keep quiet about the fact that we were responsible for Salisbury or we’ll make up stuff. Oh no it doesn’t work”)
  24. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 21 (“He reads RT so we’ll call him a Russian spy. Oh no he’s not, so do the BBC”)
  25. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 22 (“He’s a chinese infiltrator. Oh no he isn’t and we’ve revealed we are infiltrated”)
  26. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 23 (“Let’s go private companies to dig for ‘data’. On no we can’t”)
  27. Shooting ones bolt in an amusing way 24 (“Let’s try witness intimidation. Oh no its a criminal offence”)
  28. How INTERPOL spread misinformation on behalf of the FCO
  29. Why I cannot be deemed to be a threat by the UK and why the reverse is unfortunately proven fact (for interpol and others)
  30. How the UK and others have a policy to create a “threat” to justify their original false claim that I was one
  31. A question about the probity of INTERPOL